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How Well Can We Measure Well-Being?

ABSTRACT
I will define the meaning of subjective well-being that I believe is the most intrinsic
normative good, explain why improving the subjective well-being of sentient individuals
ought to be the highest ethical priority, and provide reasons for why finding a way to
measure subjective well-being would essentially benefit decision-makers and grassroots
altruists. Subjective well-being is a dauntingly nebulous property to attempt to measure
with precision, but I will comment on the progress that philosophers and social scientists
have made in this field. Although (1) there is no set of well-being criteria that is applicable
to every sentient individual (including non-human animals) and (2) most sentient
individuals are unable to communicate with us about their level of subjective well-being
use or relevant experiential factors, we may yet be able to develop an intrapersonally and
interpersonally cardinal method to measure subjective well-being.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
Suppose I told you that the magnitude of suffering that Violet is experiencing today

is twice the magnitude of the happiness she experienced yesterday. It is unclear what this
statement should mean.
First, it is unclear whether well-being is sufficiently measurable to make such a
claim. It can likely be qualitatively evaluated, but it is not obvious whether it can be
quantitatively measured.
Second, it is unclear whether happiness and suffering ought to be measured on the
same additive ratio scale. Further, this model could be an oversimplification of how affect
and experience function—there are many shades and flavors of happiness and suffering,
and to measure these all quantitatively along one axis may be an unjust and misleading
way to represent them.
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Third, it is unclear how we could know this about Violet. She may have told us that
the magnitude of her suffering today is twice the magnitude of her happiness yesterday, or
given us information from which we can draw this conclusion for ourselves. However,
some evidence suggests that she cannot objectively and accurately evaluate her own affect,
and it is not as if we can do a better job from outside her body and mind.
However, information about individuals’ well-being can be valuable to us, especially
if we are in a position to improve their well-being. Therefore, it would help us to be able to
record measurements that would allow us to draw meaningful intrapersonal, and perhaps
even interpersonal, comparisons of well-being. It would also help us to gain familiarity with
the most relevant theory of well-being.
Subjective well-being is the most intrinsic normative good because it can be enjoyed
by sentient individuals themselves. In this paper, I will argue that subjective well-being can
theoretically be measured, despite numerous obstacles.
I begin with the premise that our ideal is to maximize well-being for all sentient
individuals. I decide that the subset of well-being that we ought to be interested in
measuring is subjective well-being because factors that meaningfully impact an individual’s
well-being necessarily have some conscious effect on them. Such an effect need not be
articulable or noticed on a higher level of consciousness in order to influence the quality of
an agent’s experiences. Sometimes, conscious experiences “fall outside of introspective
awareness” or are so elusive that they “exceed our powers of discernment even while they
are occurring” (Haybron 396–397). The claim that subjective theories of well-being are the
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ones we should focus on is controversial among philosophers, but I will further support
this claim in the sections to come.
Clear definitions and measurements of the intrinsic normative goods worth
pursuing are necessary to evaluate the success of our endeavors so that we may maximize
them. Therefore, I will clearly define the meaning of subjective well-being that I am
proposing as the most intrinsic normative good.
I will also describe what scholars have written about the measurability of subjective
well-being so far, arguing both for and against its measurability. Subjective well-being is a
dauntingly nebulous property to attempt to measure with precision, but I will show that
the mission to find ways to measure subjective well-being will eventually succeed. In some
ways, it already has.
In this paper, we will look for well-being criteria that are broadly applicable across
humans and, ideally, other sentient beings. Although (1) there is no set of subjective
well-being criteria that is applicable to every sentient individual (including non-human
animals) and (2) most sentient individuals are unable to communicate with us about their
level of subjective well-being (or relevant experiential factors from which we can
determine their level of subjective well-being), we may yet be able to develop an
intrapersonally and interpersonally cardinal method to measure subjective well-being.
Additionally, we need to understand how we can measure and should try to
maximize well-being across agents. We might not want to increase the total number of
units of well-being at the large expense of a single individual’s well-being, if this is the
tradeoff given to us by the situation at hand.
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A sentient being, for our purposes, is defined as an individual who is capable of (1)
conscious, phenomenological experience and (2) a valence of experiences, or a spectrum of
qualitatively distinct experiential states. Nagel describes conscious experience like this: “no
matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all
means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism” (Nagel 436).
Sentience enables beings to feel, perceive, or experience subjectively. Humans, many
other species in the animal kingdom (if not all), and perhaps members of other kingdoms of
life are sentient. (Contrary to popular belief, even insects such as bees and fruit flies have
exhibited signs of sentience in scientific studies.)

1.1.

EQUAL CONSIDERATION OF INTERESTS
In this paper, I will assume the principle of equal consideration of interests, which

was coined by Peter Singer and is used often throughout his arguments and writings.
Singer, when describing this principle, argues that insofar as an individual has interests or,
as some philosophers might say, a valence of experiences, they can be considered sentient.
(The presence of interests or preferences is sufficient for the presence of a valence of
experiences. The presence of a valence of experiences is necessary but not sufficient for the
presence of interests or preferences.)
Singer asserts, “There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual
difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of
consideration we give to their needs and interests” and asserts that the same applies to
sentient, non-human animals with needs and interests (413). Conversely, “If a being suffers
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there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration”
(Singer 415).
This principle only applies to individuals with needs and interests—similar to how
there is no moral imperative to consider the interests of a rock, there is no moral
imperative to consider the interests of a being with no interests. Moreover, it is not
possible to consider the interests of a being with no interests, so any moral imperative to
do so would be unreasonable.

2.

DEFINING WELL-BEING AND WHY IT MATTERS
Well-being matters because (and only because) maximizing an individual’s

well-being is akin to maximizing their self-interest. What is in an individual’s self-interest is
ultimately up to them. This means that we ought to measure well-being in accordance with
a theory that emphasizes the subjectivity of well-being criteria—one that accounts for how
well-being criteria vary between individuals because each individual’s wants and interests
vary. This is to ensure that our measurements are meaningful and beneficial to our goal to
have a positive impact on sentient individuals.
Philosophers (justifiably) worry that attempts to measure well-being do not engage
with philosophical theorizing. They argue “that the question of which is the right measure
of well-being should be settled with reference to our best theory of what well-being is. …
social scientists let statistics, not theory, determine what the correct measures are in the
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first place” (Plant 123). This leaves the validity of well-being measures susceptible to
confirmation bias (the tendency to interpret new evidence as confirmation of one's existing
beliefs) from social scientists who are creating these measures. In other words, social
scientists might presumptively assume that the measures of well-being they have created
will suffice because they have found statistics that, in their view, seem to justify using those
measures.
However, social scientists ought to (1) first decide on a theory of well-being that is
sufficiently relevant and defensible, then (2) base their measures on this theory. We will
now survey what some philosophers have written about the nature of well-being and
decide which theory is most relevant and defensible. First, let us consider whether we
actually ought to side with an objective theory of well-being.

2.1

OBJECTIVE VERSUS SUBJECTIVE THEORIES
According to Matt Ferkany, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State

University, “the contrast [between objective and subjective theories of well-being] seems to
be whether or not authority concerning what constitutes a person’s well-being should rest
with that person” (2). Ferkany tentatively concludes that well-being is objective rather than
subjective, though the two are not mutually exclusive.
He argues that well-being is objective because some things are good for us
independent of our attitudes toward them or psychological states in response to them:
“Individuals do not have final authority concerning what promotes their own good and
well-being is not simply a matter of being in some psychological condition.” He asserts that

8
we ought to be skeptical about subjective theories of well-being because they “privilege
well-doing notions over well-going ones” (Ferkany 5). (Well-going concerns the quality of
our lives and well-doing concerns our psychological states.)
He cites the following example in to demonstrate why subjective theories fail
(Ferkany 18):

If we deny the vulnerability of well-being to the world outside our minds, we
inevitably accept a view according to which even the lowliest slave can be
perfectly well off, so long as he is happy or undisturbed by his situation. This is
not plausible. Even a happy slave is living a slave’s life.

Ferkany questions the idea that positive psychological states are inherently valuable
if they cannot be conceptualized in terms of some further good. According to him, hedonists
(who argue that happiness comes from pleasure) are mistaken about the nature of
happiness and, further, the nature of well-being (Ferkany 10):

Happiness is dispositional and forward-looking, not just experiential and
backward-looking, and the relevant dispositions seem patently to include
moods and affects, states not obviously reducible to desired consciousness,
attitudinal pleasure, or subjective desire satisfaction.
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When Ferkany writes that happiness is dispositional, he means that people who
have a growth mindset and other relevant personality traits live happier lives. People who
try to be happy will make their lives happier and people who do not try to be happy will
achieve the opposite: “Moody people bring a negative attitude that tends to invite
misfortune and misery; cheery, easy-going people bring a positive one and, though they
still suffer and struggle, find effective ways to get past hardship” (Ferkany 9).
When Ferkany argues that happiness is forward-looking, he means that the
narratives of people’s lives carry meaning that surpass that of mere pleasure. He explains
that a life that begins in the depths but takes an upward trend is preferable to one that
begins in the heights but slides downhill, even if the total amount of pleasure experienced
in both lives is exactly equal. I grant that this probably sounds intuitive to most of us.

The takeaway from Ferkany, I believe, is that well-being often consists of more than
some narrow definition of happiness or pleasure. Happiness can come from more than
mere comfort, feelings of pride or excitement, or similar kinds of affect. Happiness might
come from the satisfaction of completing a challenge or making a significant sacrifice for a
loved one. Happiness can come from actions that do not feel exciting or comfortable, but
are nonetheless rewarding.
We must consider that “some sentient beings with the capacity for abstract, rational
thought, can also include non-experiential aspects in their utility function” (Bruers).
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Well-being, at least for most humans, contains a cognitive component. (To be precise,
cognition probably impacts well-being because of its influence on experience, meaning that
cognitive components of well-being are not necessarily non-experiential. It is challenging to
imagine how any conscious phenomenon can be purely non-experiential.)
For example, most humans demonstrate having a narrative identity: an evolving
story of the self that (1) contextualizes their life experiences and (2) serves to instill them
with a sense of unity or purpose in life. Many humans seem to value their narrative
identities. It follows that narrative identities would shape the experiences, and therefore the
well-being, of those who value them.
Ferkany observes that people who try to be happy will make their lives happier and
people who do not try to be happy will achieve the opposite. This demonstrates how the
narratives that individuals tell themselves about what characteristics they have or what
level of well-being they are capable of can strongly influence the quality of their lives.
Additionally, humans tend to compare facets of themselves (such as appearance and
wealth) to those of the humans around them, and these comparisons can also shape
narrative identities. This might explain why humans who view themselves as inferior to
those who they compare themselves to seem to be worse off, for example.
Values (which can include an individual’s narrative identity) seem to determine, at
least in part, the criteria with which individuals judge their lives. Similarly, other values
will shape the experiences, and therefore the well-being, of those who have those values.
Valerie Tiberius and Alexandra Plakias have noticed that “the subjectively important
domains that underlie life-satisfaction reports are very similar to a person’s values. Insofar
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as values are a normative notion, introducing values into our life-satisfaction theory can
help to answer the problem of normative arbitrariness” (421). Drawing from this
observation, we can form a subjective theory of well-being that judges the quality of
individuals’ lives based on individuals’ own values and criteria. Simultaneously, such a
theory might also resolve some of the normativity issues that objectivists (like Ferkany)
are concerned about, since it would prioritize values over affective states (though most, if
not all, individuals value positive affect).
If an individual’s values include having a positive narrative conception of the self,
then this theory would account for how their narrative conception of the self impacts their
well-being. For many, as Ferkany suggests, happiness is dispositional and forward-looking,
but this is not necessarily true for every sentient being. If happiness is dispositional and
forward-looking for an individual, it is because they value what those attributes contribute
to their life—not because a philosopher prescribed that it ought to be the case.
Objective theories are commonly objected to on the grounds that “they are elitist,
since they appear to be claiming that certain things are good for people, even if those
people will not enjoy them, and do not even want them” (Crisp). While perhaps intuitively
appealing, even an objective theory claiming that autonomy is inherently beneficial to an
individual’s well-being is making an unfounded generalization. It might be the case that
most, maybe even all, individuals value autonomy. Nonetheless, it is essential to consider
that this attribute might be beneficial for the individual because the individual values it, not
the other way around.
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Most slaves are unhappy and quite disturbed by their situation, to say the least.
Ferkany is not wrong about this. However, in the unlikely case that a slave is able to thrive
(perhaps due to differences in values or priorities), we have little justification for claiming
to know more about her well-being than she does.

As we will soon explore in greater detail, personal reports of well-being are far from
infallible. We may believe that liberating a slave from her situation is worthwhile, at least
to gauge whether she will be happier once she is liberated. The same could be said about
someone who is addicted to a drug that makes them feel good. Both the slave and the drug
addict may currently underestimate their capacities to feel pleasure or fulfillment because,
perhaps, they have not yet tapped into much of that capacity. Even so, for measuring
purposes, personal reports might be the most relevant indicator of well-being that we can
obtain easily (though the limits of the scope of each individual’s knowledge and experience
are also noteworthy).

It matters that we have a positive impact on sentient individuals by each sentient
individuals’ respective standards. We cannot improve someone’s well-being if they see our
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actions as a detriment to their well-being. This conclusion necessarily directs us to
subjective theories of well-being.
Additionally, measures based on subjective theories of well-being will be more
adequately equipped to handle input from people of diverse backgrounds, values, and
cultures, as well as input from non-human animals, who likely have interests that (to
varying degrees) differ from ours.

2.2

SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING
Subjective well-being (or SWB) is commonly thought by social scientists to have

three components: evaluation, experience, and eudaimonia. Evaluation refers to “reflective
assessment on a person’s life or some specific aspect of it,” experience refers to “a person’s
feeling or emotional states, typically measured with reference to a particular point in time,”
and eudaimonia refers to “a sense of meaning and purpose in life, or psychological
functioning” (“Measuring Happiness”).
If we assume that SWB refers to the quality of an individual’s life based on the
individual’s own values and criteria, then eudaimonia would seem to factor into the
evaluation and experience components of well-being. An individual’s sense of meaning and
purpose in life impacts both how they evaluate and experience their life, according to the
definitions above. Therefore, we do not need to consider eudaimonia on its own and will
focus more on evaluation- and experience- based ways to measure SWB.
Tiberius and Plakias propose measuring SWB in accordance with the values-based
life-satisfaction account (or VBLS): “According to VBLS, life satisfaction is a positive
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cognitive/affective attitude toward one’s life as a whole, and life satisfaction constitutes
well-being when it is not defeated by considerations that undermine its normative
authority” (423).
This account avoids some of the difficulties inherent in measuring well-being in
accordance with a hedonistic theory. Some reasons why it is difficult to measure well-being
in accordance with a hedonistic theory are: (1) memories of experiences become distorted,
and (2) an individual’s level of positive or negative affect will adapt to their circumstances.
Additionally, hedonistic theories often do not discriminate between different kinds of
pleasure. They do not prioritize some kinds of pleasure over others in the same way that an
individual’s values might. Also, as Ferkany argues, the fundamental attributes of a good life
cannot be reduced to positive affect.
Additionally, we need to want, prefer, or care about the things that a theory of
well-being tells us we need. This is why we require (1) a theory that bases the criteria for
an individual’s well-being on their values and (2) a subjective theory of well-being. VLBS i s
successful, in my view, because it fulfills both of these requirements.

3.

MEASURING WELL-BEING
Dan Hausman, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin–Madison and

author of Valuing Health, contends that well-being is not measurable. He argues that
“well-being is too person-relative to measure reliably” and that well-being “is a concept
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that calls for aggregation of goods in a person’s life in a way that is duly sensitive to who
this person is” (Alexandrova 129).
The heterogeneity or subjectivity of well-being is one of the main obstacles to
measuring it, since it implies that well-being ought to be measured differently per each
individual. This makes it difficult to know precisely which indicators of well-being to
measure per individual, let alone how to measure these indicators.
Some further obstacles to measuring well-being are rooted in the idea that no
individual can understand another individual’s experiences firsthand. This poses a
challenge for any methodology that entails comparing the experiences or overall well-being
of two or more separate individuals. Such comparisons may not be feasible if the
experiences of separate individuals cannot be measured on the same scale.
This obstacle is already substantial when comparing the well-being of two members
of the same species, but it becomes even more so when comparing the well-being of
members of different species (if this is theoretically possible). In Nagel’s words, “[the]
experiences [of a different individual] … have in each case a specific subjective character,
which it is beyond our ability to conceive” (439).
Simon Knutsson from the Foundational Research Institute (FRI) claims that, in
principle, measuring well-being could be done if (1) there were a plausible method for
adding and subtracting magnitudes of happiness and suffering among individuals to
calculate a sum and (2) there were a method to prevent value judgments from influencing
the measurements of happiness and suffering and the calculations on the part of those
taking these measurements and performing these calculations.

16

It might be tempting to suggest that we explore other, more empirical avenues of
measuring SWB—perhaps we ought to look for behavior patterns, data from brain scans, or
physiological signs that we can reliably associate with higher or lower levels of well-being.
Such empirical data can, perhaps, serve as ideal proxy indicators of well-being.
First, though, let us focus on how to evaluate SWB as directly as possible, which
means at least tapping into cognitive and affective processes. Such a connection between
well-being levels and empirical data can only be verified once we know how to measure
SWB, at least for humans.
In other words, for now, behavior patterns, data from brain scans, and physiological
signs do not tell us how an individual would assess the quality of their life as a whole. If a
sufficiently causal or correlative link between levels of SWB and empirical data is
discovered, then perhaps empirical data can be used to measure SWB in the future
(Bruers),

The holy grail in neurobiology is finding the connection between brain
activities and personal utilities, just like physicists discovered the connection
between molecule velocities and room temperatures. When we find this
brain-utility connection, we can objectively determine the utility levels of all
sentient beings, even of those who cannot communicate their utilities.
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Researchers are interested in developing and executing well-being assessments,
among other reasons, to study populations of individuals. Surveying people at the
individual level presumably has valuable applications (for example, psychiatry and
therapy) but findings from surveying larger populations or individuals who represent a
larger population can lead to advances in ethical decision-making, whether we are
donating to fund an intervention, influencing policy, answering trolley problem and other
similar thought experiments, or something else.

3.1

SCALE AND QUANTIFIABILITY
Ordinal scales contain variables that have relative magnitude or ordered values.

Cardinal scales, on the other hand, must have consistent relative intervals between their
values. It seems clear that well-being can be measured along an ordinal scale, but less clear
that it can be measured along a cardinal one.
For example, well-being can be described ordinally because someone can
reasonably claim that her well-being is better today than it was yesterday. Ordinal
variables, unlike cardinal ones, cannot be added or subtracted from one another because
ordinal variables lack specified relative differences between their magnitudes or values.
Philosophers and social scientists are concerned that “researchers tend to either
treat the data as ordinal or cardinal and conduct different statistical tests as a result,
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without articulating their assumptions for doing so” (Plant 135). It is problematic that
researchers are comparing individuals’ well-being without ensuring that the metrics they
are using for these evaluations are interpersonally cardinal (or converting the evaluations
into metrics that are interpersonally cardinal) and aggregating the results as if the metrics
they are using for these evaluations were interpersonally cardinal.
Being able to add and subtract magnitudes of happiness and suffering
(intrapersonally and interpersonally) would require that happiness and suffering can be
quantified numerically similarly to concepts such as length or weight (Knutsson 4). A scale
of measurement ought to provide units to quantify the size, length, or amount of something
and allow for comparison between different sizes, lengths, or amounts.
But whether this can be done for SWB in a way that authentically reflects the
relative intensity of a variety of experiential content is hotly debated. In this case, we would
like to find a scale to measure SWB, but well-being is contingent on many experiential
factors. These experiential factors include a plethora of sensations such as (but certainly
not limited to) pleasure, comfort, confidence, enthusiasm, desire, nausea, disgust, apathy,
despair, frustration, anxiety, terror, and pain. To measure such a broad array of
experiences, each with their own color and taste, on the same additive ratio scale, could be
an impossible task.
They can also combine with each other—for example, enthusiasm and anxiety can
coexist at high intensities. Since enthusiasm is considered a positive emotion and anxiety is
considered a negative emotion, the two could cancel each other out if measured on the
same additive ratio scale. (To put this more concretely, say that a person’s enthusiasm
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added ten units to their well-being, but their anxiety subtracted ten units from their
well-being. This person would end up with a net measurement of zero units for their
well-being.) However, if this were the case, it would seem that the methodology here is
flawed. The total measurement would not end up capturing the intensity of either emotion,
but rather, nullifying both intensities.
Knutsson, who assumes that well-being is based on happiness and suffering in his
paper (though what he writes is meant to apply to any definition of well-being), further
explains why it would seem reasonable to doubt such a high degree of measurability for
well-being (5):

To illustrate this point with a more clear case, we can consider other facts that
might be finally good and bad for individuals, besides happiness and suffering.
For example, one of the things that might be finally good and bad for
individuals is to have close personal relationships, and one that might be finally
bad is to be deceived. These are plausibly not measurable on the same ratio
scale. It hardly makes sense to say that the extent to which I have close personal
relationships is about five times the extent to which I am being deceived.

However, perhaps some relevant attribute of well-being can be measured along one
scale or axis. Knutsson posits that measuring preferences, attitudes, or desires is probably
more feasible in practice than measuring well-being overall. In fact, according to the
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desire-satisfaction theory of welfare, what is basically good for a subject is the satisfaction
of their desires (Lin 1).
Philosopher Fred Feldman posits that pleasure, which I interpret to refer to a broad
category consisting of any positive affective response to having one’s desires satisfied, is
theoretically measurable (Knutsson 10). Feldman’s proposal seems both intuitive and
defensible. Pleasure and displeasure, if measured correctly, can meaningfully describe to
what extent an individual’s desires are being satisfied. Though desire-satisfaction does not
fully reflect or describe affect, it could be a meaningful indicator of how well someone’s life
seems to be going for them. Feldman illustrates his point using this example (Feldman
117):

Surely it is possible for a person to be pleased about several things at once. Tom
might be pleased to be living in Massachusetts, pleased to be sitting on his deck,
and pleased to be smelling the roses, all at one time. And, equally surely, a
person can be pleased about several things at a time, and simultaneously
displeased about several other things. Tom is still displeased about his latest
speeding ticket.

Even though, in this example, Tom is experiencing many coinciding affective states
that may conflict with one another, in theory, they all jointly determine Tom’s level of
well-being. Everything that Tom is pleased about contributes to his well-being and
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everything that he is displeased about detracts from his well-being. Perhaps well-being can
be conceptualized as simply as this.
If our goal in measuring well-being is to verify that the interventions we take to
better individuals’ lives actually make them better off, then a way to meaningfully measure
and compare individual well-being based on pleasure and displeasure might suffice.
Ideally, we would be able to measure well-being (in terms of pleasure and
displeasure) using a scale of measurable units, such as just perceivable increments, or JPIs.
Knutsson adopts this concept from classical hedonistic utilitarian Torbjörn Tännsjö. He
summarizes Tännsjö’s account of how we could theoretically measure happiness using JPIs
(7–8):

[Tännsjö] roughly endorses the idea from Edgeworth (1881) that the
magnitude or intensity of pleasure and displeasure could be measured in
principle by the number of smallest perceivable increments […] Although it
may be difficult or impossible in practice to know how many increments of
displeasure a particular, say, fish can perceive, it would allow measurement in
principle as long as she can notice increments.

Because individuals are not infinitely sensitive, each detectable increment between
different intensities of an experience can plausibly count as a unit, the total of which can be
measured per experience. These can hopefully, once sufficiently studied, be used to
measure well-being as a whole. (For example, we might be able to monitor how many JPIs
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of happiness an individual feels at various points throughout the day and observe how
these findings correspond with their evaluations of well-being.)
Using JPI measurements might also help us develop a cardinal scale that we can use
to measure well-being. Perhaps we would need to alter raw JPI s cores before placing them
on such a scale. Perhaps not. We will come back to this soon.

3.2

PLANT ON INTERPERSONAL CARDINALITY
It is possible that the raw scores individuals provide when asked to evaluate their

well-being cannot meaningfully be compared to each other without converting them
somehow. Well-being cannot easily be measured like constructs such as length and weight.
For example, someone might arbitrarily assign the discomfort they experience from having
a speck of dust stuck in their eye negative one-hundred well-being units, while another
might arbitrarily assign the misery they experience from severe depression negative ten
well-being units. These units on their own would be meaningless, since it is highly probable
that severe depression, even subjectively, is much worse than having a speck of dust stuck
in one’s eye.
Plant argues that we need not be concerned about converting raw scores. He
proposes the Raw, Universally Cardinality (RUC) thesis, which states that self-reported SWB
scales are interpersonally cardinal. Plant defends the RUC thesis, even though it relies on a
handful of counterintuitive assumptions. These are (139):

23
1. The underlying phenomenon of SWB (happiness or life satisfaction) has a
cardinal structure.
2. There is a linear relationship between self-reported and actual SWB.
3. There is a consistent scale used over time for each individual.
4. Individuals have the same maximum and minimum capacities for SWB.
5. Individuals, in a given society, use the maximum and minimum points of their
scales to refer to their maximum and minimum SWB.
6. There is consistent scale use between societies.

These conditions combined imply that scale use is intrapersonally cardinal over
time and interpersonally cardinal across societies (of humans). They are jointly sufficient
to prove the RUC thesis. However, Plant does not make it entirely clear why he assumes that
these conditions are true.
For one thing, the relationship between self-reported and actual SWB might not
actually be linear. It could, as Yew-Kwang Ng (Professor of Economics at Nanyang
Technological University) suggests, take on logarithmic or an arc-tangent form. If the
relationship between self-reported and actual SWB takes on an arc-tangent form, then
those who rate their well-being a ten-out-of-ten are significantly happier than those who
rate their well-being a nine-out-of-ten. The same would apply to those who rate their
well-being a one-out-of-ten and those who rate their well-being a zero-out-of-ten. Ng’s
theory is that “SWB is theoretically infinite but measured on a bounded scale” (Plant 144).
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On the other hand, Moral Philosopher Stijn Bruers argues that, due to the fact that
each individual has only a finite number of neurons, an individual’s SWB capacity cannot be
infinite. He writes that there is possibly a minimum amount that we can experience, as well
as a maximum amount. Sensations such as pleasure and pain come from our brains, which
contain (Bruers):

a discrete, countable number of neurons (about 100 billion in a human brain),
which consist of a discrete number of atoms following the laws of quantum
mechanics where fundamental properties are quantized. … As a result, a brain
can process a discrete, finite amount of information bits per second (about 20
million billion bits per second for the human brain).
Bruers reasons that a brain cannot process unlimited information within a limited
amount of time, since neurons (which process information in the brain) are themselves
limited in number. Thus, he concludes that there is a limit to the amount of pleasure, pain,
or any sensation, that we can experience. From a physiological standpoint, this reasoning
seems compelling.
Even if we assume that Bruers is correct on this matter, we still ought to consider
that individuals might misreport their levels of well-being. There are a variety of reasons
why individuals might misreport their SWB. For example, it is probably the case that most
individuals have never experienced the upper and lower limits of their SWB capacities.
Therefore, it is difficult for them to judge the experiences they have had relative to these
limits.
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When Plant argues that most people use a cardinal scale to evaluate their own
well-being, he cites Dutch economist Bernard Van Praag’s observation that:

… in experiments, when subjects are asked to assign numerical values of
between 1 and 1000 to five verbal labels (very bad, bad, not bad, not good,
good, very good), the consistent pattern across individuals is to space the words
so they are numerically roughly equal-interval …

This evidence suggests that most people evaluate their own well-being using a
cardinal scale, or at least do this when provided a bounded cardinal scale to use to evaluate
their well-being. Plant concludes from this that there is a linear relationship between
self-reported and actual SWB.
Let us assume for now that the evidence above determines that there is a linear
relationship between self-reported and actual SWB. I am, however, less convinced that (3)
there is a consistent scale used over time for each individual (or that SWB scales are
intrapersonally cardinal), (4) individuals have the same maximum and minimum capacities
for SWB, and (6) there is consistent scale use between societies (of humans).
I will expound upon my doubt that individuals use the same scales to evaluate their
well-being through my discussion of Haybron and affective ignorance in one of the sections
to come. These errors, however, have been shown to cancel out over large samples of data.
Therefore, the third criterion is admissible when we are considering large data samples.
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However, the fact that individuals probably do not have the same maximum and
minimum capacities for SWB is a relevant concern. Perhaps (neurotypical) humans do
share similar maximum and minimum capacities for SWB, so this concern might be more
relevant for well-being comparisons between individuals across species. In the following
section, I will discuss how, theoretically, we ought to treat differences in perception when
making well-being comparisons.
Additionally, there is likely not consistent scale use between societies of humans.
Scale use may, in fact, vary cross-culturally. Individuals raised in collectivist communities,
such as those of many Asian countries, are probably less skilled at emotional introspection
because emotional introspection is culturally discouraged. Thus, it would make sense for
them to be less sensitive toward or, perhaps, less attuned to their well-being. Haybron
writes, “Thus judgments of life satisfaction in collectivist cultures have been found to draw
less on affective state than judgments in individualistic cultures, and in some
countries—like China—may not correlate with negative affect at all” (402).
This finding suggests that people from different cultures either (1) have different
values that cause different criteria to factor into their well-being assessments, or (2) use
the scales presented to them differently. The second possibility would pose obstacles for
intercultural well-being measurements. For example, if two people from different cultures
could have the same measured well-being but different actual well-being (or vice versa),
procuring such data would be counterproductive.
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Plant’s argument that self-reported SWB scales are interpersonally cardinal might,
as it turns out, be merely wishful thinking. However, the fact that SWB cannot be measured
as easily as Plant believes does not mean that SWB cannot be measured.

3.3

DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTION
When comparing the well-being of two individuals, there are at least two relevant

potential differences in perception that we must consider. The first is how these individuals
perceive their experiences. This is important because sentient individuals have a tendency
to enjoy pleasurable sensations and dislike painful ones. The second is how these
individuals perceive the duration of their experiences. This is important because sentient
individuals tend to prefer longer pleasurable experiences to shorter ones and prefer
shorter painful experiences to longer ones (all else being equal).
Taking these differences in perception into account is especially important when
comparing the well-being of individuals from different species because there is evidence
that individuals from different species perceive differently.
First, let us focus on the differences in how individuals might perceive their
experiences. There are two amounts, or increments between intensities of experience, that
we can use to scale our measurements of well-being per individual (Bruers):
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Our perceptions appear to be discrete, with a so-called just-noticeable
difference or JND: the minimum amount an objective stimulus must be changed
before the corresponding subjective experience changes. … Our brains are also
finite, which means they cannot generate infinite experiences. Hence, there
must also be a maximum noticeable difference or MND.

We can use both JNDs (which are conceptually similar to JPIs) and MNDs to scale our
measurements of well-being per individual. We still do not know how we ought to use
these differences t o determine such scales, though. Theoretically, we have a couple of
options for how these differences might allow us to make meaningful comparisons between
the experiences or well-being of two individuals.

Our first option is to use the staircase model of experiences. This model is based on
the premise: “If a stimulus (for example: room temperature) is increased, our perception
(for example: the sensation of heat) increases with many small discrete steps, just like a
staircase.” These staircases also branch from some neutral experiential state that, in this
analogy, is a room on the ground floor. An individual in a neutral experiential state
perceives no pleasure and no pain—no significant positive or negative affect.
The staircases act like a grid, potentially with multiple dimensions, each axis of
which corresponds to a kind of sensation or stimulus: “Each sentient being has its own
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utility function that can be represented as a multidimensional staircase in a
multidimensional room” (Bruers). Some stairs go up while others go down. For example,
the stairs that correspond to pleasurable experiences might go up, while those that
correspond to unpleasurable experiences might go down.
(It is important to note that JNDs can vary intrapersonally, even for the same
sensation or stimulus. For example, our JND for temperatures we are more used to, such as
those around room temperature, might be lower than for temperatures we are unfamiliar
with, such as those that we would find extremely hot or extremely cold. In the case of our
staircase model the heights of the individual stairs in our staircases might vary, similar to
JNDs. )
Using the staircase model, JNDs are considered to be interpersonally equivalent,
meaning that each JND ought to be weighed equally. Suppose that the greatest amount of
suffering a honey bee can experience is 960,000 JNDs o
 f suffering and the greatest amount
of suffering a cat can experience is 760,000,000 JNDs o
 f suffering. (These numbers are
chosen based on the number of neurons that members of both species typically have.)
Then, if a honey bee and a cat each experience 1,000 JNDs of suffering, then both animals’
suffering ought to be considered equally because they are experiencing the same raw
amount of suffering.
Our second option is to use the normalization model. According to Breurs, we ought
to use this model if experiences are not discrete, but continuous. The normalization model
is a more relevant framework to use if we assume equal consideration of interests. It might
be the case that a honey bee is less capable of suffering and pleasure than a cat is. It also
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might be the case that non-human animals are less capable of suffering and pleasure than
humans are.
The staircase model would make more sense if individuals’ consciousnesses, and
therefore individuals’ experiences, were not contained within their bodies and minds.
However, since experiences and well-being do not and cannot transfer cross-individually, it
is more reasonable to compare the well-being of separate individuals by converting
between their scales, rather than assuming their JNDs a re interpersonally cardinal. Rather,
we should focus on how many JNDs an individual is experiencing relative to their MND.
If we are to use the normalization model, then we need to figure out how to convert
between individual scales. Bruers draws an analogy between thermometers measuring
temperature and people measuring SWB. He writes the following:

Suppose there are two rooms, each having a thermometer. One room contains a
mercury thermometer, the other a digital thermometer. The readings of the
thermometers are different: the mercury thermometer measures the
temperature in terms of degrees Celsius, the digital thermometer has other
units. You cannot move the thermometers from one room to the other. The
rooms can have different air temperatures. How are we going to find out which
room is the warmest?

This is the analogous situation of the interpersonal comparison of utility
between two persons. The two rooms correspond to the two brains of two
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persons. The air temperature corresponds to our objective utilities. The
readings on the thermometers correspond to the subjective utilities: our
subjective valuations or stated preferences.

This analogy illustrates how converting between two individuals’ scales of SWB
might be similar to converting between two scales of measurement for any other
quantifiable construct.
Bruers suggests that overcoming this obstacle for well-being measurements entails
knowing how to determine the reference point and unit of scale for each individuals’ SWB
scale. The reference point and unit of scale are points at which we can verify that each
individual’s level of SWB is the same—these points can be located anywhere on each scale.
(For example, good temperatures for determining the reference point and unit of scale
between Fahrenheit and Celsius are the boiling and freezing points of water. By observing
the readings on both Fahrenheit and Celsius thermometers at the temperatures water
freezes and boils, we now know two points at which the number of degrees in Fahrenheit is
equal to the number of degrees in Celsius.)
These can be tricky to determine for SWB. A good reference point might be the level
of well-being that individuals describe as neutral. (It is easier when the reference
corresponds to the value zero, or does so as closely as possible, depending on the
construct.) For the unit of scale, we would have to discover a point at which, similar to a
neutral affective state, individuals demonstrate equal levels of SWB.
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Once we have both a reference point and a unit of scale, we can come up with
uniquely specified linear equations that we can use to convert between two individuals’
well-being scales. (For example, x degrees Fahrenheit, minus thirty-two degrees, times
five-ninths is equivalent to y d
 egrees Celsius.) Bruers writes that we can do this, if we have
enough SWB data for each individual, by calculating the standard deviation between the
points on each individual’s scale and dividing all values on both scales by their respective
standard deviation. (Bruers assumes that (1) there is a linear relationship between
individuals’ reported and actual SWB and (2) individuals’ scales align at their neutral
state.)

Now, we will focus on the differences between how individuals might perceive the
duration of their experiences: “For example the visual perception part of a fly’s brain is four
times faster than ours, so when a fly looks at something for one second, it is comparable to
us looking at it for four seconds.” Theoretically, “After your just-noticeable time difference,
you reevaluate your utility function” (Bruers). Therefore, if a fly and a human each
experience a one-second shock, the fly might perceive the duration of the shock as four
times longer than the human perceives the duration of the shock.
If we can determine the differences between (1) how individuals perceive their
experiences and (2) how individuals might perceive the duration of their experiences, then
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we have a framework that we can use to compare well-being (and other experiences)
interpersonally.

3.4

SELF-REPORTS AND INTRAPERSONAL WELL-BEING
Each of us knows what our experiences and lives are like better than anyone else

does. As John Stuart Mill writes in On Liberty, “… with respect to his own feelings and
circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably
surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else.” And, as Dan Haybron (Associate
Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University) writes, “If we are sound judges of
anything, it seems, it would be about what our lives are like for us” (Haybron 396).
Conversely, other people can more reliably assess what their lives are like for them than we
can. The experiential content—consisting of physical and psychological states, memories,
desires, and more—of each sentient being can only truly be known by that being.
Even through communication, we will never be able to tap into what it is like to live
as another being in another body. We cannot confirm that the color red that you see
appears the same to me. Further, it is much less likely that one person can understand the
well-being of every other sentient life form in order to formulate a scale for measurement
and comparison. Even the most empathetic among us are incapable of accessing another
person’s memories and psychological states in the same way that person is.
Given that no one can truly know what another individual is experiencing, it would
seem that we must rely on individual assessments, which would require participating
individuals to honestly and accurately report their experiences. If these self-reports can be
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trusted, then, theoretically, they could lead us to accurate judgments about the well-being
of these individuals. With greater specificity, Angus Campbell (who authored “The Sense of
Well-Being in America: Recent Patterns and Trends”) argues that (Diener, et al. 4–5):

… three assumptions must be met in order for well-being judgments to be
meaningful: (a) the experiences that people encounter should add up to global
feelings of well-being, (b) these feelings ought to be relatively stable over time
(because life circumstances typically change relatively slowly), and (c) people
should be able to report these feelings with candor and accuracy. Laboratory
studies challenge these assumptions in several ways.

In fact, there is ample evidence to suggest that self-reported well-being evaluations
do not meet Campbell’s assumptions, particularly the third. Evidence shows that people are
unable to report their own well-being with candor and accuracy. This could be because
they are unwilling, incapable, or both.
Supposedly, an accurate self-evaluation of a person’s well-being would require the
person to spend at least a certain amount of time conducting a comprehensive search of
their memory for relevant information. However, people tend to fill out evaluations of their
well-being too quickly to have conducted a thorough enough memory search (which poses
an issue for the face validity of life satisfaction measures). This suggests that, when filling
out these evaluations, people are not aggregating all of the relevant information necessary
to provide an accurate assessment of their well-being.
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It is possible that people use heuristics to make speedy judgments about their
well-being, which could lead to biased reports. It is also possible that people rely on their
immediate and salient affect to inform their evaluations of their overall well-being. In any
case, such self-reports would be dubiously meaningful in Campbell’s view. Perhaps we
ought to doubt that we can trust our own conclusions about our well-being, which would
indicate that Campbell’s three assumptions cannot be met.
Haybron asserts in his paper that we as human beings evidently do a poor job at
evaluating how happy we are. He assumes a hedonistic conception of happiness in his
paper, more or less equating happiness with pleasant affect. According to him, we are both
poor at evaluating how happy we are presently and how happy we were in the past.
Different flavors of experiences are experienced differently by us, some more
consciously than others. Haybron discusses Ned Block’s controversial distinction between
p-consciousness and a-consciousness: “P-consciousness concerns the ‘what-it’s-like-ness’ of
our experience, its qualitative character, whereas a-consciousness concerns the availability
of a state to serve as a premise in reasoning and in the rational control of thought and
action—‘awareness,’ more or less” (Haybron 413). This distinction matters because
a-consciousness is more accessible than p-consciousness, which is noteworthy if (1) we
want to measure p-consciousness and (2) measuring p-consciousness necessitates our
awareness of it (or the awareness of a given sentient being).
One might think that phenomenality cannot exist without awareness. However, we
have many signs of what Haybron terms affective ignorance ( or AI). The first several
examples of AI that he mentions highlight our ignorance of our experiential states in the
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present. For instance, he describes elusive affects, or the phenomenon that some feelings
are more elusive than others. He notes that some affective states, such as anxiety, can
escape our ability to discern them while they occur, which is why they are considered more
elusive than paradigmatic ones, such as terror. However, he argues that elusive moods are
“central to the experienced quality of our lives, far out of proportion to their grip on our
attention.” Even when they are barely noticed, elusive moods play a crucial role in our
well-being at any given moment (Haybron 398).
Other kinds of AI in the present include adaptation to persistent affect (when one
persisting state we experience becomes our new perceived baseline state), attentiveness
and discernment ( when contrast between two experiential states brings attention to the
magnitude of the former state), and scale norming ( when how we evaluate our well-being
shifts depending on the range of experiential states that we are used to). Due to the
pervasiveness of AI, of which there are even more examples than those listed above, there
are many instances in which one could currently be in an unpleasant state and not know it.
Some of the following examples of AI that Haybron mentions highlight our
ignorance of our past experiential states. For example, he describes omission (when we are
unable to recall every state we experienced within a relevant window of time), peak-end
effects (the ubiquitous phenomenon that occurs when our recollection of an experience
focuses on the felt qualities of its most intense moment and its ending), duration neglect
(when our recollection focuses on the felt quality of the most hedonically salient aspects of
the experience rather than the length of the experience), and more.
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AI may perhaps lead us to counterintuitive conclusions about well-being. For
example, due to peak-end effects, extending the duration of a painful procedure but
reducing the amount of pain experienced at the end can alter a patient’s memory of the
procedure, such that they believe that it was less painful than it was (Haybron 407):

… doctors can improve the remembered quality of a painful medical procedure
(a colonoscopy) by extending the procedure, but with a slightly less painful
coda. That is, you can make an experience seem less painful in retrospect by
adding more pain. Not only did this manipulation yield surprising memories of
hedonic quality, it also affected future choices: patients given the more painful
procedure were more likely to return for another exam five years later. Similar
results have been found with a wide range of situations: the peak-end rule
appears to govern hedonic recall quite generally.

AI shows that phenomenality can exist without awareness, and that there is a
meaningful distinction between p-consciousness and a-consciousness. When there exists
p-consciousness, but not a-consciousness, it is difficult for an experiencer to evaluate a past
or present experience.
Fortunately, when an individual is surveyed many times over a long period of time
or a large population of individuals is surveyed, errors that can be attributed to AI seem to
cancel each other out.
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3.5

SHIFTING SCALES
As Haybron suggests, we have reason to believe that the scale that an individual

uses to evaluate their SWB shifts over time. This leads us to safely assume that the same
individual might be using different scales at different time slices, or, at least, it would be
difficult to know for certain that they are not. Plant writes that, if these scales shift
significantly per individual, then we might conclude that self-reports should not be taken at
face value, depending on what we are using them for: “If individuals do this, self-reports
are not intrap
 ersonally intertemporally cardinal” (148).
If SWB measures are intrapersonally intertemporally cardinal, then a one-point
increase in well-being for an individual is equivalent to a one-point increase in well-being
for them at any other time-slice. To successfully make intrapersonal comparisons of SWB
(or make SWB comparisons between the same person at different time-slices), we need to
find a way to either (1) ensure that self-reports are intrapersonally cardinal (or at least
intrapersonally ordinal) or (2) manipulate self-reports so that we can use the same scale
intrapersonally.
Let us now distinguish between adaptation and rescaling, both of which could
potentially cause scale norming (Plant 149):

If we want to accurately measure [someone’s SWB] then … adaptation poses no
issues for intrapersonal intertemporal cardinality … [but] rescaling is
problematic. It means [their] self-reports represent different levels of actual
[SWB] over time.
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Rescaling, more specifically, is when individuals adjust what they consider to be the
upper and lower ends of their SWB scales. It seems that the type of scale norming discussed
by Haybron resembles the latter rather than the former.
To be clear, scale norming in itself does not influence SWB. It affects where people
draw the lines between different ways they could evaluate their experiences, rather than
the actual quality of their experiences. While it may be evolutionarily advantageous for
individuals to change where they draw these lines, this does not mean that we can draw
meaningful conclusions about well-being from how these thresholds adapt.
Due to adapting thresholds, when an assessment asks individuals to choose a
number out of ten to represent their well-being, scale norming affects (1) the distinctions
they draw between the numbers they are choosing between and (2) the quality of
well-being that each of the numbers represent. This inhibits the extent to which the data
we collect enables us to make meaningful comparisons of well-being, both between one
individual’s well-being among several time slices and between the well-being of separate
individuals.
Unfortunately, scale norming can distort our measurements of well-being. Simply
because one person’s ten is another’s six does not mean that the first person lacks the
potential to reach the other’s ten. The range of well-being that a person has experienced
thus far does not necessarily encompass the range of well-being that they have the
potential to experience in the future. This potential matters. Conversely, the range of
well-being that a person has experienced recently does not necessarily encompass the
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range of well-being that they have ever experienced in their life. Someone may forget that
they are capable of being better off than how well off they are now, or how well off they are
now in comparison to how they were worse off before. These comparisons matter.
The claims that this potential matters and these comparisons matter might seem at
odds with our prioritization of SWB, but, ideally, the scales that we use to assess SWB can
capture the entire range of well-being that individuals are capable of experiencing, from
their absolute minimum potential of well-being to their absolute maximum potential. If
individuals are unaware of their potential for well-being, then their well-being judgments
might not be helpful for us to create a better future for them. We want sentient individuals
to be better off, whether or not they know they are capable of it. It would help them and us
to know when this is possible and when it is not.

3.6

EXPERIENCE VERSUS EVALUATION MEASUREMENTS
Haybron’s findings highlight another dilemma concerning how we ought to measure

well-being: whether we ought to evaluate it based on what people experience
moment-to-moment or based on people’s recollection of their past experiences. As
mentioned earlier, SWB consists of both experiential and evaluative components.
Bruers distinguishes between these two outlooks on experiences, or between what
he calls the experiencing self and remembering self:

The experiencing self lives in the present moment and evaluates well-being or
utility after each just noticeable time period. The remembering self evaluates
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utility for a past episode, based on memory of the experiences in that episode.
The utility function of the remembering self can be different from the (sum of)
utility functions at each of the experienced instantaneous moments, i.e. for each
of the experiencing selves during a time interval.

Conceptually, we might be more interested in measuring the well-being of a series of
an individual’s experiencing selves rather than measuring the well-being of their
remembering self. H
 owever, three well-being measurements used by researchers—the first
couple of which measure the well-being of a series of experiencing selves (the experience
sampling method and day reconstruction method) and the other of which measures the
well-being of the remembering self (life satisfaction measurements)—tend to produce
results that lead to similar conclusions per individual.

3.7

PRE-EXISTING METHODS
Now, I shall discuss some of the methods that have been used for measuring

well-being and evaluate to what extent they each succeed. To properly evaluate these
psychometrics, we must consider their reliability and validity.
The quality-adjusted life year (QALY) and disability-adjusted life year (DALY) health
metrics have widely been used by the researchers as proxy measurements for SWB. These
health metrics are typically used to gauge how undesirable it is to live with health
conditions or disabilities.
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Some researchers have expressed concern about the validity of using these methods
for evaluating well-being and other purposes. QALYs and DALYs are determined by asking
members of the public how many years of healthy life they would consider equivalent to
the value of ten years with a given health condition or disability.
One of the problems with QALYs and DALYs is that they are determined by
individuals who have never experienced the illnesses in question. These individuals, then,
must rely on their imagination rather than firsthand knowledge. QALYs and DALYs would
be more meaningful if they were determined by the individuals who have experienced the
health conditions and disabilities and, therefore, have deeper and more informed
perspectives on them (“Measuring Happiness”).
According to “Measuring Happiness,” “The ‘gold standard’ for measuring happiness
is the experience sampling method (ESM), where participants are prompted to record their
feelings and possibly their activities one or more times a day.” This method has profound
merits. For example, it grants researchers access to a series of an individual’s evaluations of
their own well-being, distributed consistently throughout a period of time. Each of these
evaluations are based on the individual’s opinion of their well-being in the present moment
when they are recording these evaluations. This limits the degree to which affective
ignorance can manipulate these evaluations, since some kinds of AI can only distort
individuals’ recollections of past experiences.
While ESM is a great way to take many samples of the quality of an individual’s
experiences (as they evaluate them in the present), it is expensive to implement and
inconvenient for the individuals being surveyed to repeatedly fill out ESM surveys. The day
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reconstruction method (DRM) is less expensive and more convenient for participants
because “respondents use a time-diary to record and rate their previous day” (“Measuring
Happiness”). Although this method might seem more vulnerable to AI distortions than ESM
does, the two methods produce comparable results. Therefore, DRM might serve as an
effective and more efficient proxy for well-being measurements.
Even so, DRM surveys take approximately forty minutes for individuals to fill out,
and this process must be repeated in most cases to get a large enough sample of data. In
comparison, collecting life satisfaction (LS) data is a much less intensive process. LS
measures usually only require individuals to answer one simple question—more or less,
how happy they are with their life as a whole. It takes most individuals approximately
thirty seconds to respond to LS surveys. Additionally, LS measures have been shown to
strongly correlate to individuals’ respective levels of SWB evidenced by ESM and DRM.
ESM can be considered an experiential measurement method, LS measures can be
considered evaluative measurement methods, and DRM can be categorized somewhere in
between. Although experiential and evaluative measurement methods are designed to
measure different phenomena, their strong correlation suggests that they can serve as
effective proxies for one another. They might be strongly correlated because “evaluative
judgments are, in part if not in whole, determined by how happy people are” (“Measuring
Happiness”).
Even if we value improving individuals’ well-being and prioritize improving the
quality of their moment-to-moment experiences rather than their satisfaction with their
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lives as a whole, it might nonetheless be wise to use LS measures as proxies for experiential
measures, such as ESM or DRM, as LS measures are much more feasible to conduct.

4.

INTERPERSONAL APPLICATIONS

Thus far, we have explored why SWB is the most intrinsic normative good, or
valuable at the very least. We have determined that SWB has significance due to its
subjective component—it is ethical to improve an individual’s well-being because their
well-being matters to them. We have addressed important considerations about how
measuring well-being can be made feasible. The next question we will explore is whether
we ought to try to maximize the total amount of well-being regardless of how we distribute
it.
The late philosopher John Taurek argues that we should not. He asks his readers to
consider the following situation (294):

… I have a supply of some life-saving drug. Six people will all certainly die if
they are not treated with the drug. But one of the six requires all of the drug if
he is to survive. Each of the other five only requires only one-fifth of the drug.
What ought I to do?
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He anticipates that some readers will argue that he ought to give his drug to the five
people, which would mean that the one other person dies. He acknowledges that (1) people
reason that, all else being equal, one ought to save the greater number, (2) intuition tells us
that five deaths is more of a tragedy than one death, and (3) according to some, morality
demands that we judge a situation from an impartial perspective. For these reasons, in
addition to the principle of equal consideration of interests t hat I mentioned earlier,
someone could convincingly argue that we ought to treat all six lives as having equal value,
and this means that saving five lives is preferable to saving one (even if the one is your
own).
Some information about these five individuals might convince him that their deaths
would be especially tragic: “Perhaps [one] is close to discovering some wonder drug or is
on the verge of negotiating a lasting peace in the world’s perennial trouble spot.”
Alternatively, having this information might convince him that their deaths would be
relatively unproblematic: “They might be five driveling old people or five idiot infants,
loved by no one” (Taurek 294–295). Perhaps this information should count. For example, if
one of the five individuals were on the verge of negotiating lasting world peace, he would
be saving far more than five people by giving them one-fifth of his drug. On the other hand,
one of the five individuals is statistically more likely to be a serial killer. If he were to give
them one-fifth of his drug, then he would be allowing more than five people to die.
Moreover, it is not as if the total happiness (or well-being) actualized across five
lives could benefit any one of them more than the total happiness actualized across their
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own life could benefit them. Taurek states that it would be ridiculous for any of the five
individuals to say the following to him (300):

Now, we would not ask you to die to make possible the net happiness realized in
the life of any one of us five. For you might suppose that you could realize as
much in your own lifetime. But it would be most unreasonable for you to think
that you could realize in your one lifetime anything like as much happiness as
we get when we add together our five distinct favorable balances.

It might seem that Taurek is disputing the principle of equal consideration of
interests. There is, however, another takeaway: that Taurek is not disputing equal
consideration of interests, but suggesting that equal consideration of interests does not
require us to multiply the interests of a group times the number of group members when
comparing a decision with its counterfactual.
There is value in this takeaway because well-being matters only insofar as it matters
to someone, which is why improving SWB is our ethical prerogative. No individual can
benefit or be disserved directly from the well-being of multiple individuals—therefore, it is
important to consider how well an action distributes well-being among individuals, rather
than how well it maximizes some overall quantity of well-being.
If equal consideration of interests does not require us to multiply the interests of a
group times the number of group members when comparing a decision with its
counterfactual, then what does this principle imply? What should we do in situations in
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which we must distribute increases and decreases in well-being among a group of
individuals?
Perhaps we ought to prioritize equality, to some extent, rather than total well-being
maximization in such situations. (Equality, in this case, refers to equality of well-being
rather than material equality. If five individuals are isolated on a desert island with scant
resources and only have enough water to sustain four of them, then they ought to use the
water to sustain four of them and allow one to die. If they distribute the water equally, then
each individual has four-fifths of the water that they need to survive and all five of them
die. In this situation, prioritizing material equality clearly does not make sense.) If one
individual is suffering and another individual is neither suffering nor happy, perhaps we
ought to prioritize improving the well-being of the suffering individual, even if we could
improve the well-being of the other individual more.

5.

CONCLUSION
Once we know how to measure SWB, we will get closer to understanding the

importance of reducing psychological pain in comparison to physical pain, preventing the
exploitation of non-human individuals in comparison to the exploitation of humans, and a
plethora of other societal and environmental problems. Measuring SWB will help us
analyze the severity of such problems and discover how we ought to prioritize them.
Measuring SWB will also help us ensure that we are making progress toward improving the
SWB of individuals and thereby ensure that our interventions are effective.
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In many situations, we must decide how to most effectively allocate our limited
resources. There are many worthy organizations to donate to, but suppose that our funds
are limited and we cannot donate to them all. It is important, then, to note that some
charities (1) provide aid to larger quantities of sentient individuals than other charities do
and (2) demonstrably improve the well-being of each individual aid recipient more than
other charities do.
The most urgent cause areas, according to the Centre for Effective Altruism (CEA),
are large in scale, highly neglected, and highly solvable. One such cause area is global
poverty (“Introduction to Effective Altruism”):

Diseases associated with extreme poverty, such as malaria and parasitic
worms, kill millions of people every year. Also, poor nutrition in low-income
countries can lead to cognitive impairment, birth defects and growth stunting.
Much of this suffering can be relatively easily prevented or mitigated.
Antimalarial bednets cost around $2.00 each. GiveWell, an independent charity
evaluator, estimates that they can significantly reduce malaria rates. Even
simply transferring money to people who are very poor is a relatively
cost-effective way of helping people. Not only does improving health avert the
direct suffering associated with sickness and death, it also allows people to
participate more fully in education and work. Consequently, they earn more
money, and have more opportunities later in life.
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Another such cause area is non-human animal welfare (“Introduction to Effective
Altruism”):

The advent of industrialized agriculture means that billions of animals each
year are kept in inhumane conditions on factory farms. Most have their lives
ended prematurely when they are slaughtered for food. Advocates for their
welfare argue that it is relatively cheap to reduce demand for factory farmed
meat, or enact legislative changes that improve the welfare of farmed animals.

Donating to charities that successfully alleviate symptoms of global poverty and
improve non-human animal welfare in industrialized agriculture goes toward reducing a
greater amount of suffering (per each individual), and the suffering of more sentient
beings, than donating to many other charities that address different cause areas would. If
we hope to make the largest impact possible, perhaps we ought to donate to charities that
demonstrably perform successful interventions in these cause areas.
Once we can measure SWB or have a valid proxy measurement, we will have a
relevant and accurate method to determine which charities make the most significant
impacts. The charities themselves could even use such data to ensure that they are
benefiting those who they are helping to the maximum degree possible. If we prioritize the
well-being of sentient individuals, which we should, this endeavor is most tractable if SWB
can be defined and measured in some way.
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I hope that I have shown you that measuring SWB is more tractable than it might
seem, while simultaneously exposing you to some of the theoretical challenges that this
endeavor faces. Certainly, further research will bring us closer to measuring SWB in a valid
and reliable way that we can implement to better our world.
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